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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest
of

CASE NO. 15947

P.L.L., a person under 18
years of age.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from an order of Judge L. Kent
Bachman of the First Judicial District Juvenile Court for
Weber County, Utah terminating appellant's parental rights
to her child P.L.L.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On June 22, 1978 appellant's parental rights to her
child P.L.L. were terminated by order of the juvenile court.
(R.8l)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant desires an order from the Utah Supreme
Court setting aside the juvenile court's order terminating her
parental rights to her child P.L.L.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1973, while married to Robert Lavine, appellant
gave birth, on July 10, 1973, to her minor daughter P.L.L.
(TR. 207)

The child was born with serious medical problems

including
a Quinney
severe
cleft
(TR. by163)
a result,
the
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child was placed, at birth, in a foster home of the Utah
Division of Family Services.

(hereafter DFS)

From the

child's birth until November, 1973 no visitation was arranged
between parents and child.
During November, 1973 Mr. David Mullens, a DFS
caseworker, acquired the case.

(TR. 69) He was in charge of

the case until April or May, 1974.

(TR.70)

Mr. Mullens

promptly arranged a visit between appellant and child during
November, 1973.

(TR.78)

January 18, 19}4

A second visitation took place on

(TR.78) followed by at least two more

visitations between January 18, 1974 and March, 1974.

(TR.78)

Several other scheduled visitations were cancelled from time
to time because either appellant, her husband, or the child
were sick and unable to attend the scheduled visitations.

(TR.·

Although the child's medical problems required that the child
remain in DFS custody for approximately a year and one-half it
was Mr. Mullens long range goal to put the child back into
appellant's home if the appellant was able to manage the
necessary care for the child.

(TR.79)

Indeed, Mr. Mullens

acknowledged that had the child not been a handicapped child

I

I

I
I
involveme":\

efforts would have been made much sooner to put the child intc
appellant's home.

(TR.80)

Also, during Mr. Mullens

with the case no instruction was given appellant on how to ca~/
for her handicapped child (TR.80) nor were any steps spelled
out to appellant to be performed in order for appellant to
obtain custody of her child (TR.79)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DFS caseworker, Vickie Rowe, assumed management of
the case in either June or July, 1974. (TR.84)

She was

responsible for the case until approximately June, 1975.

(TR.84)

During the two month interim period between David Mullens
relinquishment of the case and Vickie Rowe's assumption of case
management there were two more visitations between parent and
child.

(TR.lOB)

Those visits went well, with appellant's

concerned about and relating well to her child.

(TR.l07)

While Mrs. Rowe was in charge of the case numerous, periodic
visits were arranged between appellant and her child.

Some

visits during Vickie Rowe's administration of the case were
quite successful.

Other visits during this period were less

successful.
An initial visit under Vickie Rowe's supervision took
place on August 1, 1974 for about three hours.

(TR.86)

Nothing

unusual about appellant's care of the child was noted after
this visit.

(TR.BG)

August 6-7, 1974

A second visitation took place from

(TR.87) followed by two more overnight

visitations on August 27 and September 17, 1974 (TR.92)
Thereafter, a weeks long visitation occurred from October 2229, 1974.

(TR.96)

A sixth visitation was arranged for

December 25, 1974 (TR.l02) and again on January 13, 1975.
The last visit under Ms. Rowe's supervision took place on
March 29, 1975.

The two month gap in visitation resulted

from an illness of the child.

(TR.l03)

Ms. Rowe also testified

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that she could recall three or four occasions when the appell
had requested visitation with her child which had been denied
because the child was ill.

(TR.lOl)

Then, after the Easter,

March 29, 1974 visitation, Ms. Rowe's notes reflected that
the appellant had contacted her twice more seeking visitation
but again, P.L.L. was ill and unable to visit with appellant.
(TR.l05)
While Ms. Rowe did instruct the appellant on how to
care for the child when the child was left at the appellant's
home, Ms. Rowe had not had any previous training or experience
in working with a mother of limited intelligence.

(TR. 109-101

Other than from her immediate supervisor, Ms. Rowe did not
seek any other more qualified professional help in terms of
training appellant in the skills appellant would need in order
to gain custody of her child or improve the quality of care
appellant was giving her child.

(TR.llO)

The only referral

made by Ms. Rowe seeking outside training for appellant was
to the Weber County Mental Health parenting classes which
appellant attended regularly from October 29 through December
2, 1974.

(TR.ll3)

It is significant to note that the quality

of care appellant provided to her child during and after she
attended the parenting classes improved considerably.

(TR.lOl-~

Again, there was a two month span during which the
case was managed byonePat Purcell, another DFS caseworker.
No visitations between parent and child nor contacts by DFS
with appellant were recorded.
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In September, 1975 Ms. Deola Gearhart, yet another
DFS caseworker, assumed responsibility for the case of P.L.L.
(TR.l24)

Ms. Gearhart's first contact with appellant was on

October 15, 1975 when appellant went to Ms. Gearhart's office
and requested visitation with her child.

Visitation was

arranged and took place on October 17, 1975.

(TR. 125)

Appellant again contacted Ms. Gearhart on November 28, 1975
requesting a Christmas visitation which occurred on December
24-25, 1975.

This Christmas visitation itself went well

with no apparent problems being discernible.

(TR.l29)

Between

these two visitations Ms. Gearhart made no efforts at all to
contact appellant or to arrange any visitation.

(TR.l27)

Indeed, from taking over the case it was Ms. Gearhart's position
that all of the responsibility for initiating contacts between
DFS and a parent rested upon the parent

(TR. 268-69) and the

result of no contacts only goes to prove the parent not interested in the welfare of the child.

(TR. 269)

At least as early as January, 1976, Ms. Gearhart had
made a conscious decision that appellant's parental rights to
P.L.L. should be terminated.

(TR. 142)

As a result no steps

were ever taken by DFS to work with appellant to correct any
inadequacies in appellant's home.

(TR. 131, 134) Indeed, by

December 9, 1975, Ms. Gearhart was already taking active ,steps
to terminate appellant's parental rights

(TR.l55)

From

December 25, 1975 until March, 1977 appellant had no further
visitations with her daughter, although there was testimony
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by theGearhart
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
digitization
provided
by the occasion
Institute of Museumto
and Library
Services
from
Ms.
thatFunding
shefordid
have
one
discuss
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

this with appellant and appellant indicated to Ms. Gearhart
that someone had told appellant she wasn't allowed to visit
her child.

(TR. 130-31)
On January

10, 1977 the juvenile court scheduled

a review of DFS custody of P.L.L.

Appellant appeared at that

hearing and requested custody of her child.

(R. 27)

A hearing

on the custody question was scheduled for February 14, 1977
but that hearing was continued because the county attorney
couldn't appear on that day.
March 2,

1977~

(R.30)

The hearing was reset for

At the conclusion of the March 2, 1977

hearing the court entered the following order:
That the Division of Family Services prepare
a report as to the type and cost of the surgery
P
will need. Further, that this matter be and
is hereby continued to the 15th day of March, 1977
at 9 a.m.
Further, the above named child's grandparents may visit with said child for a half a day
every other week. Visitation with the mother is
to be worked out between the mother and the Division
of Family Services. (R. 34)
Custody of the child was denied to appellant.

Also, the

respective grandparents of P.L.L. who had also sought custody
of the child were denied custody because while both sets of
grandparents had suitable homes, the juvenile court felt
the specialized medical needs of the child beyond the capabilities of the grandparents.

(R. 36)

1

Visitation between P.L.L. and the grandparents follo>1
the March, 1977 court hearings.
into May, 1977.

(TR. 144)

These visitations extended

Ms. Gearhart was completely aware

that appellant would also be present at the respective grandSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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parent's home to have visitation with her daughter on those
days.

(TR. 146)

However, at this point, Ms. Gearhart uni-

laterally stopped these previously court ordered visitations
(TR. 146-48) despite repeated calls from the grandparents
attempting to exercise their court ordered visitation rights.
(TR. 256) These steps were followed on November 28, 1977 by
the filing of a petition seeking termination of the parental
rights of appellant.

(R.41)

A denial was entered on January

18, 1978 (R. 78) and trial set for March 30, 1978.

That

trial setting was vacated because the state failed to file
responses to the appellant's discovery requests.

(R. 78)

Another trial setting was made for April 27, 1978 and again
vacated because of the states failure to respond to appellant's
discovery requests.

On April 12, 1978, appellant had filed

a motion to dismiss the
of parental rights.

state~

(R. 65)

petition seeking termination

but the state was permitted to

respond and trial reset for May 18, 1978.

That setting was

again vacated because DFS would not grant access to subpoenaed
records from DFS files.

(R. 79)

Finally, On June 15, 1978

trial was held resulting in the termination order.

(R. 79-80)

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING IS
AN ADULT CASE, AND A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING OF A
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE TO WHICH THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION MUST APPLY.
THEREFORE, IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REQUIRE
APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AGAINST HERSELF.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Section 78-3a-48 (1) (a) permits the juvenile court
to decree a termination of parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the court finds:
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or
incompetant by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child;
While the proceedings to accomplish a termination of parental
rights are denominated "civil proceedings" Section 78-3a-44 (1) I
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the juvenile court is actually a
specialized, hybred, court system invested with statutory
authority to

~tilize,

from time to time, both the civil and

criminal procedural rules.

Section 78-3a-19 gives the

juv~ni~~

court jurisdiction to try adults for criminal offenses committe.
against children, furthermore, Section 78-3a-20 states:
In proceedings in adult cases the practice
and procedure of the juvenile court shall conform
to the practice and procedure provided by law or
rule of court for criminal proceedings may be
commenced by complaint and a trial jury shall
consist of four jurors .•••
It is the examination into the wrongful conduct or condition
of the parent or parents which gives the quasi criminal nature
to termination proceedings otherwise denominated "civil."
Because it is the wrongful conduct or condition
of the parent, seriously detrimental to the child, which is
actually on trial in a termination proceeding, a termination
case must properly be looked at as primarily an adult case
rather than a child's case.
this point.

This court has begun to recognize

In State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B.,

577 P.2d 119, 124-25 (1978) this court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

The statute does not provide that termination
may be predicated on the best interests of the
child;
this is a standard applicable to a
custody disposition. The best interests of the
child may be a resulting benefit, but it ca~not
be the primary point of departure, upon which
termination hinges.
Obviously, the primary point of departure upon which a
termination may hinge is the wrongful conduct or conditions
of the parent or parents, seriously detrimental to the child.
In substance then, a termination proceeding in the
juvenile court is actually a forfeiture proceeding whereby
a parent may be required to forfeit the parent-child relationship.

Upon a showing of wrongful conduct or condition on

the part of a parent which cannot or will not be corrected
by the parent, after notice and opportunity implemented, by
reasonable efforts of assistance, the juvenile court may
require a forfeiture of the parent-child relationship.
Nearly a century ago the United Stated Supreme
Court decided Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
That case dealt with a situation where the government was
seeking a forfeiture of property

alleged to have been fraud-

ulently imported without paying the necessary duties.
forfeiture proceedings in Boyd

The

were, like in our juvenile

court, denominated civil proceedings.

The Supreme Court

stated at 622:
... We are also clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring
the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of
offenses committed by him, though they may be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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civil in form, are in their nature criminal ...
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures,
incurred by the commission of offenses against
the law are of this quasi criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion
of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ...
In accord with Boyd, the United States Supreme Court decided
the more recent case of United States v. United States Coin
and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) which also dealt with a
forfeiture proceeding.

In United States Coin and Currency

the government has instituted a forfeiture proceeding to
obtain money seized from a person's possession at the time
of his arrest for violating federal gambling registration and
tax statutes.

The court in citing Boyd, supra reiterated that:

proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man's property
by reason of offences committed by him, though
they may be civil in form, are in their nature
criminal.
Therefore, a Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination must apply where money liability is predicated upon a
finding of the owner's wrongful conduct.

United States v.

United States Coin and Currency, supra, at 718.
For a termination of parental rights to be ordered
by the juvenile court the evidence must show wrongful conduct
or condition of the parent extending beyond simple neglect
or dependency, which is "such a substantial departure from
the norm as to constitute a condition seriously detrimental
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to the child."

State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B.,

supra, at 121.

It is the examination of the wrongful conduct

or conditions of the parent, seriously detrimental to the
child, that invests the termination proceeding with the
quasi criminal aspects similar to the forfeiture of property
proceedings set out in Boyd and United States Coin and Currency.
This brings the termination proceeding within the purview of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination for
civil proceedings as spelled out in Boyd and United States
Coin and Currency.
In State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B. supra,
at 124 this court stated, "A parent has a fundamental right,
protected by the constitution, to sustain his relationship
with his child." If a Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination can be said to attach in a civil forfeiture
proceeding involving property certainly the privilege must
apply in a civil forfeiture proceeding involving the fundamental
Constitutional right to the parent-child relationship.
POINT II
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FAILED TO ESTABEISH
THAT APPELLANT WAS REASONABLY NOTIFIED OF ALLEGED
INADEQUACIES IN THE ENVIRONMENT SHE PROVIDED FOR
HER CHILD; AND, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT REASONABLE
EFFORTS OF ASSISTANCE WERE EXTENDED BY DFS TO
APPELLANT TO CORRECT ANY INADEQUACIES ALLEGED TO
EXIST IN APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILD.
State v. Lance, 464 P.2d 395 (1970) and State of
Utah, in the interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119 (1978) have
firmly established that "it is a condition precedent to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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termination that the conduct or condition alleged to be
seriously detrimental to the child cannot be corrected, after
notice and opportunity implemented, by reasonable efforts of
assistance." State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B., ~~
at 124.
In reaching its decision to terminate appellant's
parental rights to P.L.L., the juvenile court placed heavy
reliance upon the fact that while training might assist the
mother in providing basic survival care for her child, that
it would not enable appellant to provide her child with proper
parental care and protection.
two fundamental errors.

(R. 91)

This finding has

First, no legitimate steps were

ever undertaken to diagnose appellant's strengths or alleged
inadequacies in providing adequate care for her child, nor
was any such information properly made known to appellant.
Secondly, no legitimate efforts, which failed, were ever
made to extend reasonable assistance to appellant to overcome
her weaknesses and build upon her strengths in caring for her
child as a condition precedent to termination.
Testimony at trial revealed that only DFS caseworker
Vickie Rowe gave appellant some basic types of positive instructions on how to care for the child in terms of feeding,
clothing and bathing the child.

I

It was these brief instructionJ

sessions, as Ms. Rowe dropped the child off with appellant for
visitation, that the juvenile court relied upon in finding,
as a condition precedent to termination, that appellant had
been informed of inadequacies in the environment she was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sessions constituted reasonable efforts of assistance to
appellant to correct the alleged seriously detrimental conduct
or conditions.

(TR. 290)

In reaching this finding, the court

discounted entirely the very significant factor that Ms. Rowe
had absolutely no training or past experience at all that
would have qualified her to be able to adequately convey to
and instruct appellant about alleged inadequacies in appellant's
ability to care for her child.

(TR. 109-10)

This of course,

is significant because with a parent of limited intellectual
abilities a legitimate question arises as to whether or not
brief and hastily given instructions on child care would be
adequately comprehended.

To have assured that appellant was

fully informed about and actually understood DFS complaints
about alleged inadequacies in her abilities to care for her
child qualified professional help should have been brought
into the case to assure that appellant did fully understand
her alleged inadequacies and would thereby receive a bona fide
chance to correct the inadequacies.
The far more important failure in this case however,
was the failure of DFS to extend reasonable efforts of assistance
to appellant to correct the alleged conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child prior to seeking an order
of termination of parental rights.

Again, the juveni,le court

relied solely upon the brief instructional sessions by Vickie
Rowe as constituting the reasonable assistance required under
the circumstances.

The question then becomes was this in fact
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reasonable assistance under the circumstances?
Both psychologists who testified aL trial agreed
that appellant has the ability to provide her child with
basic survival care.

(Dr. Furlong-TR.42; Dr. Grow-TR.65-66)

If a parent possesses the capability, without training, to
provide basic survival care enabling the child to survive
but not necessarily thrive or be adequately stimulated,
reasonable assistance as a pre-condition to seeking termination
would require that some additional steps be undertaken in
terms of supplemental training to determine if the parent can
be trained sufficiently to provide an even better level of
care for her child.
It is submitted that the capacity to provide basic
survival care is in itself sufficient to defeat a termination
petition because, as acknowledged by Dr. Furlong in his
testimony to the court, the situation of a parent raising a
child in basic survival conditions is not that uncommon.
(TR. 43)

Therefore, that factor is not such a departure from

the norm as to fall within the legislative meaning of seriously
detrimental to the child.

However, separate and apart from

the ability to provide basic survival skills no efforts at
all were made to increase the appellant's ability to provide
a better quality level of care for her child.
was able to render a realistic

Indeed, no, one

opinion as to whether or not

appellant could or could not be helped

to

raise the level

of her ability to care for her child because no such efforts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had been made. When Dr. Furlong was asked the direct question,
his response was "Well, I don't know, I honestly don't know."
(TR. 45) Far too much uncertaintly exists on such an important
question.
As a condition precedent to termination basic
fairness requires that appellant be given a reasonable
opportunity to have the child in her horne, absent wilful
neglect or abuse, with qualified professional supervision
and training before she be deemed to be unable to correct
conduct or conditions which might otherwise preclude her
from having custody or maintaining parental rights to her
child.

The petition to terminate parental rights was for

this reason premature under these particular circumstances.
The juvenile court's order should be vacated and the case
remanded to the juvenile court with instructions that bona
fide efforts be made to assist appellant in caring for her
child as a condition precedent to seeking a termination in this
case.
POINT III
THE INADEQUACIES OF CONDUCT OR CONDITION ALLEGED
TO BE SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CHILD ARE NOT
SUCH SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE NORM AS TO
SUSTAIN A DECREE OF TERMINATION.
In In the interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311, 1316
(1976) quoting State v. McMaster, 468 P.2d 567

(1971) the

Utah Supreme Court adopted the position that in order for a
termination of parental rights to be sustained the conduct or
condition ascribed to the parent must be such a substantial
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departure from the norm as to constitute a condition
seriously detrimental to the child.

The evidence in the pre-

sent case failed to establish conduct or condition on the
part of the appellant which was such a substantial departure
from the norm that a termination can be sustained.
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light
most favorable to the state, it showed only that the appellant
is borderline mentally retarded thereby limiting her ability
to care for her child.

There was no evidence at all that

the appellant had ever willfully neglected or abused her chiN
at any time.
On the question of the conduct or condition of the
appellant being a substantial departure from the norm the
testimony of Dr. Furlong, who testified on behalf of the
state, is of particular importance.

This testimony is containeJ

generally in pages 40-43 of the trial transcript.
Dr. Furlong testified:

In

partic~u

(TR. 42-42)

Q: And at that time do you recall telling me that
it was your opinion that Mary Lavine could provide P

, the

Child, with basic survival care?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And is it your opinion from testing her that

she could provide basic survival care for the child?
A:

Yes.

Q:

What's that mean?

A:

Well, it means that the child likely would
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stimulated, but would survive.
Q:

Now, is that type of situation an uncommon

circumstance around the country as far as you know?
A:

I would think it's not uncommon.

(emphasis added)

If it is not uncommon that throughout the country there are
many parents of skills and abilities comparable to appellant
who, although capable of providing only basic survival care,
are raising their children under similar conduct and conditions
this, while unfortunate, does not establish such a substantial
departure from the norm justifying a termination of parental
rights.
POINT IV
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES IS ESTOPPED
FROM SEEKING A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
HEREIN BECAUSE DFS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE PLAN CALCULATED TO DESTROY APPELLANT'S
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP.
Through the summer of 1975, appellant regulqrly
maintained contact and visitation with her daughter.

At

this point in time Ms. Deola Gearhart was given management of
the case.

Ms. Gearhart acknowledged on cross-examination

that she initiated no steps whatever to attempt to build or
maintain the parent-child relationship between appellant
and her daughter.

(TR. 144)

It was her view that responsibility

for arranging visitation between appellant and her child
rested solely on the appellant.

Further, even after the

juvenile court had ordered in March, 1977, that visjtation
between grandparents and P.L.L. and appellant and her daughter
take
Ms.LawGearhart
deliberately
and
unilaterally
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were upsetting the child.

(TR. 145)

These visitations were

terminated even though Ms. Gearhart knew that appellant was
seeing her child when the child would be taken to the home of
the respective grandparents.

(TR.l46)

The visitations, after

being unilaterally terminated in late summer, 1977, were not
resumed.
The deliberate policy of DFS, specifically Ms.
Gearhart, in trying to build a favorable record sufficient to
support a decree of termination is clearly demonstrated by
Ms. Gearhart's answers to cross-examination on pages 155 and
156 of the trial transcript.

In June, 1976, Ms. Gearhart

filled out a Social Services Contract which detailed her
plan for handling this case.

The document said "Mother's

visits will be limited and closely supervised."

This work

plan was entered with the knowledge that it takes continuous
and active interaction between a mother and daughter under
these circumstances to foster any sort of parent-child
relationship.
The chronicled actions of Ms. Gearhart permitted
DFS to place appellant in a catch-22 type situation.

The

reasoning goes - parental rights can be terminated because
appellant has not visited her child and therefore, has no
interest in the child - because the child isn't visited by

appellant this is seriously detrimental to the child permitting
termination - however, the appellant can't see her child because DFS won't let her see her child, or refuses to initiate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

any steps to maintain the relationship.

By failing to

attempt to maintain or build appellant's relationship with
her child, DFS clearly violated appellant's fundamental
right to maintenance of a family relationship.

In this

circumstance DFS must not be permitted to profit by its
intentional and wrongful inaction.
CONCLUSION
As has been pointed out many times, termination of
parental rights is a very drastic

and

extreme action to be

taken against a parent and then only in the most serious
cases.

It is a step which should not be taken at all until

it can be conclusively shown that a parent cannot or will not
correct the conduct or conditions alleged seriously detrimental
to the child.

It is not an action which should be based

upon conjecture and supposition as has been done in this instance.
The mother must, as a precondition to termination, be given
a bona fide chance to have the child in her custody, with
proper and adequate supervision in order to determine whether
or not conduct or conditions alleged seriously
to the child can be corrected.

This not having been done in

this case, the termination proceeding
cannot be sustained.
DATED this

~ay

detrimental

of

was premature and

fi.ct-?n-6-t-1./ '

19 7 8.

Respectfully submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
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